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Editor's note: Despite years of US aid to El Salvador's army, senior officers there are becoming
disenchanted with their US military advisers and the strategy of "low intensity conflict" promoted
by the Pentagon. Outspoken critic of US policy Sigifredo Ochoa Perez, a former military field
commander, has found widespread support among the nation's junior officers, a trend that signifies
major divisions within the military leadership. [The LADB has received permission from the Pacific
News Service to reproduce the following article by Bob Ostertag, PNS correspondent, issued the
week of Sept. 7-13.] SAN SALVADOR Sigifredo Ochoa Perez, short, stout, and square-jawed,
measured his words carefully: "The problem is that the Americans see us as simple chess pieces
in their grand strategy. It is not important if a million Salvadorans die if this is what's involved
in their plans, it's all very well for you. But when an American dies here, your country screams
bloody murder. In truth, I'm not sure it's good to be an ally of the United States." It is not unusual
to hear such sentiments from rebel sympathizers in this war-torn country. But Ochoa is no leftist.
At 44, he is an outspoken leader, once considered among the best field officers in the US-supported
army, whose increasingly harsh criticisms of the direction of the war have become a sharp thorn
in the side of the high command and its US advisers. Oddly enough, after seven years of a civil
war into which the US has poured over $2 billion, transformed an antiquated security apparatus
into a modern counterinsur- gency army, built a substantial air force from scratch, and provided
scores of military advisers, Col. Ochoa is not convinced the US really wants to win the war. His
doubts bear a broad resemblance to criticisms voiced at the height of the Viet War by many South
Vietnamese army officers who believed the US did not honestly want to win that war, either.
"The policy with which the US is directing the war, a foreign policy to us here in El Salvador,
has practically tied the hands of the armed forces," Ochoa alleged. "We feel we are controlled by
US advisers: do this, don't do that...It's a half war." Since his controversial retirement from the
army earlier this year, the fiery Ochoa has emerged as an unofficial spokesman for younger active
duty officers, who themselves must maintain a strict professional unity before the press. Ochoa is
thought to have substantial support, particularly among middle level officers frustrated with the
army's inability to terminate the prolonged conflict. As a member of the large class of 1966 at the
Salvadoran Military Academy, known as the Tandona, Ochoa reputedly has extensive connections
among former classmates recently promoted to front line command positions. Ochoa's views
are echoed in a secret document written by an American military specialist under independent
contract for the Salvadoran armed forces, which was recently circulated among army officers
and right-wing politicians. The report alleges that: * US advisers have prevented the army from
pursuing the rebels as aggressively as they might; * Advisers put too much time into regulating
how the Salvadorans should fight the war, and not enough time on technical training; * Battlefield
leadership by the advisers has been hampered by their short tours of duty, which are considered
an easy route to promotion involving little personal risk; * To prevent a coup, or the emergence
of a strong military leader who might eclipse the civilian government, advisers back mediocre
officers for promotion to top positions. Potentially the most explosive revelation in the document
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 1 of 2

LADB Article Id: 076081
ISSN: 1089-1560

is the belief among many Salvadoran officers that US agents might have been behind the death
of Col. Domingo Monterrosa, considered the army's most respected field commander, who died
in a mysterious helicopter crash several years ago. Ochoa evinced extreme caution when asked
about the affair. "I won't accuse the Americans, or anyone specifically. But, yes, we have had doubts
about Monterrosa's death, tremendous doubts that were never clarified. It wasn't the guerrillas
so it must have been something in the helicopter. The big question is who could have done it?"
The US embassy would not comment on the Salvadoran officers' suspicions. Ochoa's new role as a
civilian politician follows a contentious military career marked by bitter conflicts with his superiors.
In 1982, he emerged as leading field commander, effectively driving rebel forces from a region in
central El Salvador flanked on either side by guerrilla strongholds. Rebels themselves described
the campaign as brilliant. In 1983, a confrontation between Ochoa and then defense minister Jose
Guillermo Garcia over the direction of the war was only resolved with Garcia's eventual ouster and
Ochoa's being packed off to diplomatic exile in Washington, DC. The incident prompted a former
top US mlitary adviser to comment, "Ochoa's a bright light if we can keep his mouth shut." But
this was not to happen. After returning to El Salvador, Ochoa was given command of the rebeldominated Chalatenango province. When President Duarte's daughter was kidnapped by rebels
in 1985, Ochoa spoke out against the negotiations and later increasingly against the conduct of the
war itself. The result was a second exile to Washington, and his subsequent resignation from the
army. Soon thereafter, he joined the Nationalist Republican Alliance party (ARENA). While Ochoa
has found a sympathetic audience among the nation's junior officers, few are willing to openly
endorse his call for a military shakeup and, on the record, other Tandona members still emphatically
support the role of the advisers. Col. Roberto Staben, commander of the elite US trained Arce
Battalion, acknowledged the crucial role US resources have played for the army, but complained
of the advisers' lack of actual experience in guerrilla warfare. "The last experience they had was
Grenada," he said disparagingly, referring to the 1983 US invasion of the tiny island nation. Within
the high command of the armed forces, only a small minority share Ochoa's views. Col. Mauricio
Vargas, current head of operations in the high command, dismisses Ochoa's barbs as demagoguery.
"His declarations create a momentary euphoria, but their effect is like Alka Seltzer: psssstt, and then
gone...because reality reimposes itself." Despite Vargas' show of indifference, all the Salvadoran
officers interviewed, even senior commanders like himself who do not otherwise support Ochoa,
displayed particular annoyance with "low intensity conflict," the doctrine recently developed by the
Pentagon for fighting counterinsurgency wars, which provides the guidelines for US advisers here.
"For us this is not a low intensity conflict," snapped Col. Vargas. "It is a crisis period. The concept of
low intensity conflict is for internal consumption in the US. If you want to help El Salvador and its
hunger, don't bring us Big Macs and french fries. Here we eat beans and tortillas."

-- End --
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